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THREE CHALLENGES FOR PHARMACEUTICAL
ANTITRUST
Michael A. Carrier*
Pharmaceutical antitrust law is hard. When drug companies delay
generic entry, is that beneficial “life-cycle management”? Or is it
unjustified anti-competitive behavior? The question arises in multiple
settings, including patent settlements by which brand firms pay generics
to delay entering the market, product reformulations made to prevent
generic adoption, citizen petitions filed with the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration (FDA), and the denial of samples that generics need to
enter the market.
Courts confront challenges when addressing these complex
questions. And sometimes, they veer astray. Why? This essay seeks to
answer that question, cataloging three mistakes courts have made in this
setting, which are based on (1) complexity, (2) simplicity, and (3)
Sisyphus.
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Pharmaceutical antitrust law is hard. When drug companies delay
generic entry, is that beneficial “life-cycle management”? Or is it
unjustified anti-competitive behavior? The question arises in multiple
settings, including patent settlements by which brand firms pay generics
to delay entering the market, product reformulations made to prevent
generic adoption, citizen petitions filed with the U.S. Food and Drug
Administration (FDA), and the denial of samples generics need to enter
the market.
Courts confront challenges when addressing these complex
questions. And sometimes, they veer astray. Why? This essay seeks to
answer that question, cataloging three mistakes courts have made in this
setting, which are based on (1) complexity, (2) simplicity, and (3)
Sisyphus.
I. COMPLEXITY
First, the pharmaceutical industry is unique in its complexity, with
nuanced markets and multiple regulatory regimes.
A. Markets
Pharmaceutical markets are complex. Unlike other markets, “the
consumer who pays does not choose, and the physician who chooses
does not pay.”1 This disconnect has created a gap that can be exploited.
Brand firms can convince doctors to prescribe expensive drugs even if
equally effective cheaper drugs are available. In fact, brands have done
so through an array of activity that includes samples, mailings, detailing
(sales calls to doctor’s offices), sponsored continuing medical education
programs, and advertising in media and medical journals.2
This range of activity entails significant expenditures, with brands
often spending more on marketing than on research and development
(R&D).3 And it has been effective. Just to give one example, nearly half
the doctors in one study considered information provided by sales
representatives important and almost one-third changed their prescribing
behavior as a result.4 At the same time, adding another layer of
complexity, drug firms have increased direct-to-consumer advertising,

1. BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROTECTION, DRUG PRODUCT SELECTION: STAFF REPORT
TO THE F.T.C. 2 (Jan. 1979).
2. STUART O. SCHWEITZER, PHARMACEUTICAL ECONOMICS AND POLICY 87-93 (2d
ed. 2007).
3. E.g., id. at 82; Ana Swanson, Big Pharmaceutical Companies are Spending Far
More on Marketing than Research, WASH. POST, Feb. 11, 2015.
4. SCHWEITZER, supra note 2, at 85.
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which has resulted in doctors acceding to patients’ wishes and writing
more prescriptions.5
B. Regulatory regime
In addition to complex markets, the pharmaceutical industry is
characterized by a complicated regulatory regime consisting of patent
law, the Hatch-Waxman Act, and state drug product selection laws.
First is the patent system. The pharmaceutical industry and its
advocates famously trumpeted the costs of bringing a drug to market and
its need for patents.6 In “product-hopping” cases (in which the brand
firm switches from one version of a drug to another just to stifle generic
entry), brands highlight the benefits of their (often patented)
reformulated drugs.7 And in cases in which brands settle patent
infringement litigation by paying generics to delay entering the market,
the brands seek to highlight the strength of their patents.8
The second aspect of the regulatory regime is the Hatch-Waxman
Act, Congress’s calibration of the patent and antitrust laws in the
pharmaceutical industry.9 The Act fostered innovation through patent
term extensions, periods of market exclusivity not based on patents, and
an automatic 30-month stay of generic approval.10 The Act also
increased generic competition by allowing experimentation on a drug
during the patent term, letting generics rely on brands’ safety and
effectiveness studies, and providing 180 days of marketing exclusivity
to the first generic (known as a “Paragraph IV filer”) to challenge a brand
firm’s patent.11
Third are state drug product selection laws, which are in effect in
all 50 states and are designed to lower prices to consumers.12 Absent a
doctor’s contrary instructions, these laws allow (and in some cases
5. Id. at 98-99; see also Chloe Reichel, Direct-to-Consumer Drug Advertising Spikes
Demand, BUSINESS ETHICS, May 8, 2018, https://www.businessethics.com/2018/05/08/direct-to-consumer-drug-advertising-spikes-demand/.
6. See, e.g., Joseph A. DiMasi et al., Innovation in the pharmaceutical industry: New
estimates of R&D costs, 47 J. HEALTH ECON. 20, 31 (2016) ($2.6 billion to bring drug to
market in 2013).
7. See, e.g., In re Suboxone Antitrust Litig., 64 F. Supp. 3d 665, 674 (E.D. Pa. 2014).
8. E.g., King Drug Co. of Florence, Inc. v. Cephalon, Inc., No. 2:06-cv-1797, 2015 WL
6750899, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 5, 2015) (finding that evidence relating to patent could be
considered when the alleged purpose was “to demonstrate that a reasonable litigant could have
believed the patent to be valid at the time of the reverse-payment settlements.”).
9. Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 355).
10. Michael A. Carrier, Unsettling Drug Patent Settlements: A Framework for
Presumptive Illegality, 108 MICH. L. REV. 37, 43-45 (2009).
11. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv).
12. Norman V. Carroll et al., The Effects of Differences in State Drug Product Selection
Laws on Pharmacists’ Substitution Behavior, 25 MED. CARE 1069, 1069-70 (1987).
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require) pharmacists to substitute generic versions of brand drugs.13 The
laws address the disconnect between prescribing doctors who are not
responsive to price and paying insurers and consumers who do not select
the drug.14 In particular, they carve out a role for pharmacies, which
vigorously compete on price with other pharmacies and which enjoy
higher margins on generic drugs.15
II. SIMPLICITY
One way courts have dealt with complex markets and regulatory
regimes is by applying simple frameworks. Courts have full dockets,
pharmaceutical antitrust cases are complicated, and rather than engage
in what could lead to the outcome most consistent with the regulatory
regime’s goals, courts sometimes resort to approaches that lead to quick
resolutions. Four such approaches focus on an encouragement of
settlement, a patent’s presumptive validity, the number of products on
the market, and the size of the generic firm. The first two approaches
were prevalent in the decade before the Supreme Court rejected them in
2013 in FTC v. Actavis.16 The latter two have not been overturned.
A. Settlement
The first simple framework courts adopted, in the context of
settlements of patent litigation, was based on a general policy in favor of
settlement. Courts before Actavis recognized that settlements conserve
resources, provide certainty that encourages investment, and result in
licenses increasing competition.17 These courts also noted that
settlements were particularly beneficial for patent litigation, which is
lengthy, complex, and costly.18 For these reasons, the court in In re
Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litigation explained that “ ‘ courts are bound
to encourage’ . . . settlement[s].”19 The court in Schering-Plough Corp.
v. FTC found that “[t]he general policy of the law is to favor the
settlement of litigation” and that “the policy extends to the settlement of
13. Michael A. Carrier, A Real-World Analysis of Pharmaceutical Settlements: The
Missing Dimension of Product Hopping, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1009, 1017 (2010).
14. BUREAU OF CONSUMER PROTECTION, supra note 1.
15. Steve D. Shadowen et al., Anticompetitive Product Changes in the Pharmaceutical
Industry, 41 RUTGERS L.J. 1, 13-15 (2009).
16. 570 U.S. 136 (2013).
17. See In re Schering-Plough Corp., 36 F.T.C. 956, 999-1003 (2003), vacated,
Schering-Plough Corp. v. F.T.C., 402 F.3d 1056, 1058 (11th Cir. 2005); U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, ANTITRUST GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 5 (1995).
18. In 2017, patent litigation in which there was more than $25 million at risk cost on
average $3 million. AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW ASS’N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC
SURVEY 41 (2017).
19. In re Tamoxifen, 466 F.3d 187, 202 (2d Cir. 2006).
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patent infringement suits.”20 And the court in In re Ciprofloxacin
Hydrochloride Antitrust Litigation highlighted the “long-standing policy
in the law in favor of settlements, [which] extends to patent infringement
litigation.”21
In the crucial Actavis decision, the Supreme Court appropriately did
not immunize settlements from antitrust scrutiny. In particular, it
provided five reasons why the “general legal policy favoring the
settlement of disputes” did not displace ordinary antitrust analysis.22
First, the Court emphasized that settlements have the “potential for
genuine adverse effects on competition,” explaining that “[t]he payment
in effect amounts to a purchase by the patentee of the exclusive right to
sell its product, a right it already claims but would lose if the patent
litigation were to continue and the patent were held invalid or not
infringed by the generic product.”23 Second, the Court noted that the
“anticompetitive consequences” of reverse-payment24 settlements would
“sometimes prove unjustified.”25 Third, the Court linked the size of the
payment to market power: “where a reverse payment threatens to work
unjustified anticompetitive harm, the patentee likely possesses the power
to bring that harm about in practice.”26 Fourth, the Court explained that
“an antitrust action is likely to prove more feasible administratively than
the [court below] believed.”27 And fifth, the Court noted that its rule
“does not prevent litigating parties from settling their lawsuit,” as “[t]hey
may, as in other industries, settle in other ways, for example by allowing
the generic manufacturer to enter the patentee’s market prior to the
patent’s expiration, without the patentee paying the challenger to stay
out prior to that point.”28
In conclusion, the Court synthesized, five considerations, “taken
together, outweigh the single strong consideration—the desirability of
settlements—that led the [court below] to provide near-automatic
antitrust immunity to reverse payment settlements.”29

20. 402 F.3d 1056, 1072 (11th Cir. 2005).
21. In re Ciprofloxacin, 544 F.3d 1323, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
22. Actavis, 570 U.S. at 153-58.
23. Id. at 153-54.
24. These are called “reverse payments” because the consideration flows from patentee
to alleged infringer (unlike typical settlements in which alleged infringers pay patentees).
25. Actavis, 570 U.S. at 156.
26. Id. at 157.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 158.
29. Id.
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B. Presumptive validity
The second simplistic framework that courts before Actavis applied
upheld settlements based on a presumption of patent validity. Section
282 of the Patent Act states that patents “shall be presumed valid.”30
Courts relied on this presumption as a starting point in ascertaining the
validity crucial to determining the appropriate antitrust treatment.31 A
settlement that allows generic entry before the end of the term of a valid
patent promises to accelerate competition. In contrast, if the patent were
invalid, a settlement delaying entry beyond the date the generic could
have entered could allow the firms to divide the market, with the brand
obtaining the assurance that generic entry will be delayed and the generic
getting the certainty of knowing it will receive payment.32
For reasons similar to the rejection of the scope-of-the-patent test
articulated below, the Court in Actavis appropriately recognized that
“[t]he patent . . . may or may not be valid, and may or may not be
infringed” and that “an invalidated patent carries with it no . . . right . . .
[to] permit the patent owner to charge a higher than competitive price
for the patented product.”33 In other words, a patent cannot conclusively
be presumed to be valid. It must be shown to be so. That makes sense
since the Patent Act’s presumption of validity (1) is only a procedural
evidentiary presumption; (2) should be entitled to the least amount of
deference in situations in which the parties enter agreements that prevent
validity from even being challenged; (3) is undermined by the HatchWaxman Act’s encouragement of invalidity challenges; and (4) is
questioned by empirical studies that have shown that a significant
percentage of granted patents are invalid.34
C. Number of products
The third example of a simplistic approach is based on courts’
assessment of the number of products involved. The case of Walgreen
v. AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals, which involved AstraZeneca’s
conversion from heartburn drug Prilosec to Nexium, is instructive.35 The
plaintiffs alleged that there was “almost no difference” between the
drugs and there was “no pharmacodynamic reason” the two forms would
have different effects in the body.36 The plaintiffs also alleged that
AstraZeneca “aggressively promoted and ‘detailed’ Nexium to doctors”
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

35 U.S.C. § 282(a).
See Carrier, supra note 10, at 62.
Id.
Actavis, 570 U.S. at 147 (emphasis in original).
Carrier, supra note 10, at 64-65.
534 F. Supp. 2d 146 (D.D.C. 2008).
Id. at 149.
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while stopping its promotion and detailing of Prilosec.37 And they
claimed that AstraZeneca was able to switch the market (to a barely
different reformulation receiving patent protection for an additional 13
years) only through “distortion and misdirection in marketing,
promoting and detailing Nexium.”38
The court ignored the plaintiffs’ detailed allegations of the price
disconnect (by which the doctor who prescribes the product does not pay
for it, and the consumer [or her insurer] who pays for it, does not choose
it). The court granted AstraZeneca’s motion to dismiss, concluding that
“there is no allegation that AstraZeneca eliminated any consumer
choices.”39 But that conclusion rested on three factual assertions, all of
which required the court to ignore the price disconnect. The court
asserted that:
(1) AstraZeneca added choices . . . [by] introduc[ing] a new drug to
compete with already-established drugs . . . [;]
(2) [D]etermin[ations of] which product among several is superior
. . . are left to the marketplace[; and]
(3) New products are not capable of affecting competitors’ market
share unless consumers prefer the new product.40
Each of those factual assertions contradicted plaintiffs’ allegations
regarding the price disconnect and its effects.41 In a price-disconnected
market, doctors’ switching prescriptions from an original branded
product (facing impending generic competition) to a reformulated
product (not facing generic competition)—what the court called
“add[ing] choices”42—significantly impairs consumers’ ability to
choose a generic product. The “added choice” of the reformulated
product is actually the means by which consumers’ real choice is
eliminated. In addition, the question should not be which product among
several is superior, but rather which product offers the consumer the best
trade-off between price and quality, a determination that “the
marketplace” cannot make in a price-disconnected market. In fact, when
brands switch the market from the original to the reformulated version,
they are capable of affecting competitors’ market shares despite
consumers’ preferences because of the effects of significant promotion

37. Id. (footnote omitted).
38. Id. at 148-49.
39. Id. at 151.
40. Id.
41. First Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial for Walgreen Co. at 8,
Walgreen Co. v. AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals L.P., 534 F. Supp. 2d 146 (D.D.C. 2008).
42. Walgreens, 534 F. Supp. 2d at 151.
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and marketing.43 The court’s contrary assertion ignored not only the
plaintiffs’ detailed allegations, but also the economic rationale of state
substitution statutes and the Hatch-Waxman Act. None of those statutes
would be necessary if consumers in fact revealed their preferences
through price/quality choices.
D. Size of generic
A final approach based on simplicity focuses on the size of the
generic company. One example is presented by the Third Circuit’s
decision in Mylan Pharmaceuticals v. Warner Chilcott (Doryx).44 In that
case, Warner Chilcott engaged in an array of concerning behaviors: it
stopped selling capsule versions of acne-treating Doryx to wholesalers;
removed Doryx capsules from its website; worked with retailers to
“auto-reference” the Doryx tablet whenever a doctor filed a Doryx
prescription; informed wholesalers, retailers, and dealers that “Doryx
Capsules have been replaced by Doryx Tablets”; and bought back and
destroyed capsule inventory.45 The Third Circuit nonetheless rejected
Mylan’s claims of anticompetitive conduct, finding that “Mylan was not
foreclosed from the market.”46 Even though it found, “viewing the facts
in the light most favorable to Mylan, that defendants had indeed made
the Doryx ‘hops’ primarily to ‘delay generic market entry,” it affirmed
summary judgment for the defendants.47
After concluding that the plaintiff—the competitor generic
manufacturer—failed to adduce evidence of monopoly power, the court
indicated that it would have affirmed summary judgment on the
alternative ground that the plaintiff failed to satisfy its initial burden of
introducing evidence of an anticompetitive effect under the Rule of
Reason.48 The court, however, never explained what it considered to be
an anticompetitive effect. Nor did it consider whether a substantial
reduction in the prescription base available for automatic generic
substitution would count. Instead, in direct opposition to the Supreme
Court’s instruction that the relevant effect is on consumers, not

43. E.g., STUART O. SCHWEITZER, PHARMACEUTICAL ECONOMICS AND POLICY 87-93
(2d ed. 2007) (doctors are subject to “a vast array of drug promotion, which includes detailing
(sales calls to doctor’s offices), direct mailings, free drug samples, medical journal
advertising, sponsored continuing medical education programs, and media advertising”).
44. 838 F.3d 421 (3d Cir. 2016).
45. Id. at 429.
46. Id. at 438.
47. Id. at 431 (quotation omitted).
48. Id. at 438.
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competitors,49 the court focused exclusively on the effect of Warner
Chilcott’s conduct on Mylan, the generic competitor, never even
mentioning the effect on consumers.50
Regarding the product hops’ effects on Mylan (and assuming this
were an appropriate inquiry), the court offered only a series of nonsequiturs, asserting that Warner Chilcott’s conduct was not
anticompetitive because:
(1) Mylan received a 180-day exclusivity period under the HatchWaxman Act (although Mylan’s sales at relatively high generic prices
are irrelevant to whether Warner Chilcott substantially reduced the
number of sales and profits that Mylan would have made absent the
product hop)51;
(2) Mylan set its generic price higher than the brand price for a
period of time (although the court failed to explain the relevance of this
fact and did not consider whether the product hop caused Mylan’s
pricing strategy, as a generic unable to distribute its product through
automatic substitution could increase the price for the sales it can
make)52; and
(3) Mylan made profits of $146.9 million on the sales of generic
Doryx (although that number does not mean much unless compared to
the profits that Mylan would have made absent the product hops).53
In short, the court focused on Mylan’s status as a “Goliath”
competitor, taking its eye off the ball of what should have been the goal:
the consumer.
III. SISYPHUS
Quick. Don’t think of a patented blue elephant. What do you think
of? Well, a patented blue elephant, of course. (Assuming you’re not
wondering how a blue elephant could be patented.) Brand firms have an
array of patented blue elephants they can parade before courts. In other
words, brand firms defend their behavior by offering plausible-sounding
arguments that sometimes are difficult for courts to dislodge from their
analysis.

49. Harrison Aire, Inc. v. Aerostar Int’l, Inc., 423 F.3d 374, 385 (3d Cir. 2005) (noting
that Supreme Court in Brunswick v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, 429 U.S. 477, 488-89 (1977), held
that “antitrust laws protect consumers, not competitors”).
50. Doryx, 838 F.3d at 439.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
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Brand firms offer not only arguments that sound legitimate on their
face but also frameworks that create enough uncertainty that they are
significantly more likely to win. The mythological figure Sisyphus
labored to push a boulder uphill. But the progress he achieved in inching
the boulder uphill was quickly followed by the boulder rolling back
downhill.54 So too do courts feel the pressure to let the boulder roll
downhill when they are confronted with arguments difficult for plaintiffs
to disprove. This section discusses eight of these hurdles, focusing on
arguments based on safety, product liability, immunity, innovation, the
scope of the patent, risk aversion, patent validity, and assisting rivals.
A. REMS: Safety
The first challenge stems from brands’ claims that they should not
be forced to share samples of their drugs with generics because of safety
concerns. The context in which this has most frequently arisen involves
Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies (REMS) programs.55
Pursuant to legislation enacted in 2007, the FDA requires REMS when
a drug’s risks (such as death or injury) outweigh its rewards.56 Brands
have used this regime, intended to bring drugs to the market, to block
generic competition.
Brands have claimed that they should not be compelled to share
their samples with generics because of safety concerns. For example,
Celgene contended that the sale of samples imposed safety concerns as
the “ingestion of . . . two teratogenic drugs [which produce birth defects]
by unknown, healthy subjects entails risk of fetal exposure, which is why
Mylan discusses its safety measures at length” and Celgene “need not
accept others’ conclusions that . . . these measures are adequate.”57 In a
different case, Celgene “question[ed] the efficacy” of the generic’s
“study protocol’s safety.”58 And Actelion explained that it “has an
obvious and legitimate commercial interest to make sure that its liability,

54. Sisyphus, ENCYCLOPAEDIA BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/topic/Sisyphus (last visited May 26, 2019).
55. Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies (REMS), F.D.A.,
https://www.fda.gov/drugs/drug-safety-and-availability/risk-evaluation-and-mitigationstrategies-rems (last visited May 26, 2019).
56. U.S. Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007 (FDAAA), 21 U.S.C.
§ 355-1(a)(1).
57. Brief in Support of Defendant Celgene Corporation’s Motion to Dismiss at 4, Mylan
Pharms. Inc. v. Celgene Corp., No. 2:14-cv-02094-ES-MAH, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 182222,
at *17 (D.N.J. May 25, 2014).
58. Lannett Co. v. Celgene Corp., No. 08-3920, 2011 WL 1193912, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Mar.
29, 2011).
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reputational issues, and concerns are taken into account and are dealt
with.”59
The problem is that brands’ concerns that a generic’s use of samples
automatically poses a heightened risk for which they would be
responsible are misplaced. Use does not occur in a vacuum. The FDA
ensures the safety of not only brand drugs but also generics. The agency
tightly regulates the use of samples, including through clinical trials.60
As a generic official has explained, “merely having a sample doesn’t
mean a company has unfettered discretion to use it improperly, to have
poor clinical trials, [or] to expose their employees to risk” since the FDA
“continues to monitor what happens to that sample.”61 An attorney for
generic company Roxane explained that generics “have been buying
samples and using them for years and years and years, of both REMScovered and non-REMS-covered drugs, and there has never been some
parade of horribles in terms of a brand being forced to come in and
monitor what we’re doing.”62 Finally, safety concerns are significantly
reduced when the samples are used for lab testing rather than on
humans63 or (showing the illusory nature of such concerns) when brands
provide samples to noncompeting research organizations.64
B. REMS: Product liability
Brand firms also have defended their refusal to provide samples to
generics on the grounds of product liability. Celgene, for example, has
contended that its sale of samples would impose heightened risks, stating
that it “would face increased exposure to products liability suits for sales
to generic . . . filers,” as “[s]ome courts have accepted the notion that a
branded drug manufacturer may be liable for injuries caused by the
generic drug it did not sell.”65 Celgene also worried that “Mylan makes
lengthy allegations regarding its willingness to indemnify Celgene”
while noting that “Celgene is not required to accept these risks even with
indemnification.”66 In a separate case, Celgene complained that a

59. Transcript of Motions Hearing at 100, Actelion Pharm. Ltd. v. Apotex, Inc., Civil
Action No. 1:12-cv-05743 (D.N.J. Oct. 17, 2013), ECF No. 93.
60. CREATES Act: Ending Regulatory Abuse, Protecting Consumers, and Ensuring
Drug Price Competition: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Competition, Policy &
Consumer Rights, S. Judiciary Comm., 114th Cong., at 1:49:11 (testimony of Beth Zelnick
Kaufman), https://www.c-span.org/video/?411609-1/creates-act-ending-regulatory-abuseprotecting-consumers-ensuring-drug-price-competition.
61. Id.
62. Actelion Transcript, supra note 59, at 65.
63. Id. at 58.
64. Id. at 110.
65. Celgene Brief, supra note 57, at 17.
66. Id.
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proposed generic insurance policy “has inadequate limits of liability and
does not cover human clinical trials.”67
Most fundamentally, such claims are not consistent with the HatchWaxman Act, the relevant regulatory regime that the Supreme Court
made clear in Verizon Communications v. Trinko that antitrust must be
“attuned to” and take “careful account” of.68 Generic access to samples
during the patent term was an essential aspect of the regime, allowing
generics to avoid replicating clinical studies.69 Allowing brands to deny
samples based on product-liability (or safety) justifications would
undermine the carefully balanced tradeoff between competition and
innovation at the heart of the Hatch-Waxman Act.
If there were any question remaining as to brands’ concerns with
product liability, it would be dispelled by brands’ refusals to accept
generics’ proposals to indemnify them for product liability claims.
Similar to insurance and self-insurance, generic indemnification can
serve a vital role in managing brand risk. But the cases reveal brands’
lack of interest in such risk management.
In Mylan v. Celgene, for example, Mylan agreed, over the course
of a five-year negotiation for the sale of Thalomid, to indemnify Celgene
for liability resulting from Mylan’s studies.70 Even at the time of this
essay, eleven years after the parties signed an indemnification agreement
in April 2009, the sale has not yet occurred. And for the sale of Revlimid,
Mylan offered Celgene an executed indemnification agreement and
alleged that it “requested the purchase of limited Revlimid samples for
bioequivalence testing, offering to pay market value,” to which Celgene
responded with a “voluminous information request” and rejection of
“Mylan’s offer to enter into an indemnification agreement, which
included nearly every concession to terms Celgene requested” during
earlier negotiations on Thalomid.71
C. Citizen petitions: Immunity
A third argument brand firms have advanced stems from claims that
the citizen petitions they file are immune as a type of petitioning conduct.
Under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, “[t]hose who petition [the]

67. Lannett, 2011 WL 1193912, at *2.
68. 540 U.S. 398, 411 (2004).
69. Michael A. Carrier, Unsettling Drug Patent Settlements: A Framework for
Presumptive Illegality, 108 MICH. L. REV. 37, 42-43 (2009).
70. Transcript of Oral Opinion at 6, Mylan Pharms. Inc. v. Celgene Corp., No. 14-2094ES (D.N.J. Dec. 22, 2014), ECF No. 54.
71. Plaintiff Mylan Pharms.’ Brief in Opposition to Celgene’s Motion to Dismiss at *10,
Mylan Pharms. Inc. v. Celgene Corp., Civ. Action No. 2:14-cv-02094-ES-MAH, 2014 U.S.
Dist. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 1435 (D.N.J. June 16, 2014).
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government for redress are generally immune from antitrust liability.”72
This doctrine, however, contains a well-established exception for sham
conduct. Even in Noerr itself, the Supreme Court cautioned that
petitioning behavior could lose its protection if it were a “sham to cover
what is actually nothing more than an attempt to interfere directly with
the business relationships of a competitor[.]”73 Since the Noerr decision,
the Supreme Court has applied the exception to misrepresentations made
to courts and administrative agencies,74 including patent-infringement
suits based on a patent obtained through fraud.75
Many citizen petitions are questionable. Even though they are
meant to raise legitimate safety concerns with the FDA, my empirical
research found that the FDA has denied nearly all of the petitions. In
particular, I found that the FDA denied 92% of petitions targeting
generic entry, with that figure rising to 98% for petitions filed at the “last
minute,” within six months of the expiration of a patent or FDA
exclusivity period.76
In addition to these general findings, particular examples
demonstrate concern in the form of:
• Multiple petitions (such as Teva’s 8 petitions on MS-treating
Copaxone and Shire Viropharma’s 24 petitions on a lifethreatening gastrointestinal infection)77;
• Late-filed petitions (such as Bayer Healthcare filing a
petition one day before the expiration of the patent on
Mirena, a long-acting intrauterine device (IUD))78;
• The combination of citizen petitions and product hopping
(as shown by acne-treating Doryx)79; and

72. Prof’l Real Estate Investors, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., 508 U.S. 49, 56 (1993);
see United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965); E.R.R. Presidents Conference
v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 136, 140-41 (1961).
73. Noerr, 365 U.S. at 144.
74. E.g., Cal. Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 512 (1972).
75. Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 176-77
(1965).
76. Michael A. Carrier & Carl Minniti, Citizen Petitions: Long, Late-Filed, and at-Last
Denied, 66 AM. U. L. REV. 305, 308, 323 (2016).
77. Id. at 344-46; see generally Complaint for Injunctive and Other Equitable Relief,
FTC v. Shire ViroPharma Inc., (D. Del. Feb. 7, 2017); FTC v. Shire ViroPharma Inc., 917
F.3d 147 (3d Cir. 2019).
78. Carrier & Minniti, supra note 76, at 346-47.
79. Id. at 347-49.
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• The combination of petitions and entry-delaying settlements
(as shown by Mylan’s allergic-emergency-treating
EpiPen).80
The FDA has also voiced unease with this conduct. In seeking to
invigorate its ability to summarily deny petitions submitted “with the
primary purpose of delaying” generic approval, the agency introduced a
draft guidance articulating relevant factors, which included long-delayed
petitions, repetitive petitions, submissions immediately before generic
approval, petitions without support, and a history of concerning
petitions.81
In short, any attempted defense based on petitioning immunity runs
headlong into the sham nature of petitions that are almost always denied
and that often raise significant concerns of delayed generic competition,
which directly harms consumers by increasing price.
D. Product hopping: Innovation
The fourth argument is based on innovation. Innovation is a core
American value, like baseball and apple pie. So, when brand firms (and
commentators supporting them) claim that their behavior is needed for
innovation, it is difficult for courts to resist the spell. One setting in
which the issue arises involves “product hopping.”
Two respected commentators, Joshua Wright, a former
Commissioner on the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), and Judge
Douglas Ginsburg, a Senior Judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
D.C. Circuit, have offered the most thorough argument for why
innovation should receive deference and antitrust liability is not
appropriate for product hopping.82 The authors worry that “applying a
standard competition law analysis is likely to deter innovation that would
have benefitted consumers.”83 They contend that “innovations,

80. Id. at 350-51; Michael A. Carrier & Carl J. Minniti III, The Untold EpiPen Story:
How Mylan Hiked Prices by Blocking Rivals, 102 CORNELL L. REV. ONLINE 53, 64-66 (2017).
81. U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Servs., FDA, Citizen Petitions and Petitions for
Stay of Action Subject to Section 505(q) of the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act:
Guidance for Industry, at 16, Oct. 2018,
https://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/GuidanceComplianceRegulatoryInformation/Guidan
ces/UCM622235.pdf.
82. Joshua D. Wright & Douglas H. Ginsburg, Comment on the Canadian Competition
Bureau’s Draft Updated Intellectual Property Enforcement Guidelines 2 (Aug. 10, 2015),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/734661/150810canadacomm
ent.pdf.
83. Id.
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including even small changes in product design, can generate significant
consumer benefits.”84
The authors claim that “[c]ompetition law is not a suitable
instrument for micromanaging product design and innovation” as it
“requires competition agencies and courts to weigh the benefits to
consumers from the innovation against any costs to consumers arising
from the diminution of competition.”85 The agencies and courts are “illequipped” to make these determinations, and it is “unclear” whether such
a balancing “can be done at all.”86
The authors trust not the antitrust agencies but the “judgment [of]
the value of product design changes levied by consumers in the
market.”87 The apparent problem of applying antitrust law is that
agencies and courts would be “substituting their judgment for the
judgment made by consumers.”88 The authors claim that subjecting drug
reformulations to antitrust scrutiny “most remarkably assumes that
pharmaceutical markets are somehow so different from other product
markets that producers are free to ignore consumer judgments about the
value of product innovations.”89
In contrast to these assertions, however, no empirical or other
evidence suggests that a well-structured antitrust analysis would deter
innovation in this setting.90 For the subset of potentially anticompetitive
reformulations, antitrust scrutiny is likely not to deter innovation, but to
spur it. Brand firms often withhold incremental innovations from the
market to use them later as part of a product hop.91 For example,
manufacturers in one case sought approval for a new treatment in
connection with a reformulation even though “[t]he data necessary to get
the new indication was available much earlier.”92 Similarly, in a second
case involving criminal liability for promoting off-label uses of a
84. Id. at 2. See also Mylan Pharms. v. Warner Chilcott, 838 F.3d 421, 440 (3d Cir. 2016)
(worrying about courts “balanc[ing] the important public interest in encouraging innovation
in the pharmaceutical industry with [its] obligations to protect consumers and to ensure fair
competition under the antitrust laws” while at the same time being “wary both of secondguessing Congress’s legislative judgment and of turning courts into tribunals over innovation
sufficiency”).
85. Wright & Ginsburg, supra note 82, at 2.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 3.
88. Id. at 4.
89. Id.
90. For a more detailed critique, see Michael A. Carrier & Steve D. Shadowen, Product
Hopping: A New Framework, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 167, 201–05 (2016).
91. Maribel Rios, The Outsourcing Advantages in Formulation Development (Jan.
2005),
https://files.pharmtech.com/alfresco_images/pharma/2014/08/22/c5f902d1-917e4f63-83fa-48e96af5c645/article-141797.pdf
92. Steve Shadowen et al., Bringing Market Discipline to Pharmaceutical Product
Reformulations, 41 INT’L REV. OF INTEL. PROP. & COMP. LAW 698, 710 (2011).
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seizure-treating drug, the brand firm conceded that a “principal reason
for not seeking FDA approval for those uses was that it wanted to reserve
them for a later promotional campaign for its reformulated product.”93
And in the last case, the brand firm waited until generic competition for
the twice-daily drug was imminent before introducing the once-daily
version, even though “[a]ll other . . . disease treatments are administered
once a day.”94 It is telling that in this case, the brand firm had obtained
FDA approval to market the once-daily version three years earlier but
had withheld it from the market until entry of the twice-daily generics
was looming.95
Limiting antitrust scrutiny of product hopping to “sham
innovations” is a recipe for anticompetitive behavior in complex markets
that would have dramatic effects on consumers. At the same time, the
talisman of “innovation” is difficult for courts to resist. As a result,
courts could apply an excessively deferential approach that allows
product hops that make no sense other than delaying generic entry.
E. Scope of patent
In the settlement context, the first—and perhaps most
fundamental—boulder running downhill involves the “scope” of the
patent. Between 2005 and 2012, courts upheld reverse-payment
settlements that allowed generic entry (even with payment) at or before
the end of the patent term. The Ciprofloxacin court found that “[t]he
essence of the inquiry is whether the agreements restrict competition
beyond the exclusionary zone of the patent.”96 The Schering-Plough
court similarly concluded that reverse payments were “within the
patent’s exclusionary power.”97 The Tamoxifen court found that the
settlement did not “unlawfully extend the reach” of the patent.98 And
the court in Valley Drug v. Geneva Pharmaceuticals sought to achieve
“[a] suitable accommodation between antitrust law’s free competition
requirement and the patent regime’s incentive system” by immunizing
activity within the patent’s scope.99
The Court in Actavis correctly rejected the scope test,
understanding that “[t]he patent . . . may or may not be valid, and may
or may not be infringed” but that “an invalidated patent carries with it
93. Id.
94. New York v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638, 647 (2d Cir. 2015).
95. Id. at 647-48.
96. Ark. Carpenters Health & Welfare Fund v. Bayer AG (In re Ciprofloxacin
Hydrochloride Antitrust Litig.), 544 F.3d 1323, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
97. Schering-Plough Corp. v. F.T.C., 402 F.3d 1056, 1072 (11th Cir. 2005).
98. Joblove v. Barr Labs., Inc. (In re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litig.), 466 F.3d 187,
213 (2d Cir. 2006).
99. Valley Drug Co. v. Geneva Pharm., 344 F.3d 1294, 1307 (11th Cir. 2003).
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no . . . right . . . [to] permit the patent owner to charge a higher than
competitive price for the patented product.”100 Importantly, the Court
made it clear that the relevant question was not merely what rights patent
law would have conferred. It concluded that “[i]t would be incongruous
to determine antitrust legality by measuring the settlement’s
anticompetitive effects solely against patent policy, rather than by
measuring them against procompetitive antitrust policies as well.”101
Rather, both antitrust and patent policies were relevant to determining
the proper “scope of the patent monopoly—and consequently antitrust
immunity—that is conferred by a patent,” as “[w]hether a particular
restraint lies beyond the limits of the patent monopoly is a conclusion
that flows from [traditional antitrust] analysis and not . . . its starting
point.”102
It thus would have appeared clear after Actavis that the scope-ofthe-patent argument was no longer an effective justification that the
settling parties could rely on. But the difficulties of finally burying this
argument are revealed by the lure of the claim that generic entry before
patent expiration is procompetitive. On its face, and with Actavis
receding ever further into the rearview mirror, courts are tempted to find
that pre-expiration entry provides “extra” competition that is good for
the consumer. As discussed immediately below, an FTC Administrative
Law Judge (ALJ) and a district court took this bait.
In In the Matter of Impax Laboratories, the ALJ concluded that it
was “procompetitive” for a settlement to permit a generic “to enter the
market eight months before the original patents expired.”103 Such entry
allowed “consumers [to] benefit[] . . . by having uninterrupted and
continuous access” to the generic, with this “product on the market and
available to consumers today” because the generic “had the foresight to
negotiate licenses to future patents.”104 The ALJ stated that entry before
the end of the patent term “can be considered in assessing the
[settlement’s] competitive consequences.”105 And the ALJ even
downplayed the anticompetitive harm at the heart of Actavis by claiming
that “the magnitude or extent of such harm is largely theoretical, based
on an inference” that the generic’s entry date would have been earlier
without the reverse payment, and that this theoretical harm was

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Actavis, 570 U.S. at 147 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 148.
Id. at 148-49 (emphasis in original).
Dkt. No. 9373, at 144, 146 (FTC ALJ Chappell May 18, 2018).
Id. at 146.
Id.
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outweighed by “the . . . substantial . . . real world procompetitive
benefits” of the settlement.106
A similar ruling occurred in the context of a generic’s
underpayment for products provided by the brand firm. In that case, the
FTC claimed that Abbott (AbbVie’s parent company) paid Teva to delay
entering the market with a generic version of testosterone gel AndroGel
by providing Teva with an authorized generic version of cholesterol drug
TriCor at “a price that is well below what is customary in such
situations.”107 In granting defendants’ motion to dismiss, however, the
court failed to recognize a potential payment, formalistically finding that
“the AbbVie Defendants are not making any payments to Teva,” but “[i]t
is Teva which is paying Abbott for the supply of TriCor.”108 The court
recognized that “the FTC correctly alleges that something of large value
passed from Abbott to Teva,” but erred in concluding that “it was not a
reverse payment under Actavis.”109
The court then compounded its error in insufficiently recognizing
payment by linking it to the scope-of-the-patent test. Not recognizing
that the patent could have been invalid or not infringed, the court praised
the agreement’s “allow[ing] Teva to enter the AndroGel market almost
six years prior to the expiration of the ‘894 Patent.’ ” 110 The court
viewed this as “an early entry date into the AndroGel market.”111 And
the court considered the separate agreement involving TriCor as
“procompetitive” since it “allows Teva to enter the cholesterol drug
market with a generic product to compete with Abbott’s product and thus
advantage the purchasers of cholesterol drugs.”112
In short, the Impax and TriCor rulings are examples of courts
applying the scope-of-the-patent test unequivocally rejected in Actavis.
Generic entry before the end of the patent term is procompetitive only if
the patent is valid and infringed. But whether there is a valid, infringed
patent is precisely the inquiry short-circuited when a brand pays a
generic to drop its patent challenge. And given that 89% of patents in
settled litigation cover not the active ingredient but only ancillary aspects
(with the majority of these patents ultimately overturned113), the revival
of the scope test threatens significant harms.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

Id. at 156-57.
F.T.C. v. AbbVie Inc., 107 F. Supp. 3d 428, 436 (E.D. Pa. 2015).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 438.
Id. at 436.
C. Scott Hemphill & Bhaven Sampat, Drug Patents at the Supreme Court, 339
SCIENCE 1386, 1387 (2013) (finding that companies are less likely to win on secondary
patents (32%) than on active ingredient patents (92%)).
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F. Settlements: Risk aversion
Another boulder in the settlement context involves brands’
justifications for settlement based on an aversion to risk, in other words,
an attempt to avoid the chance that the patent would be declared invalid
or not infringed. Such an argument, however, can only be considered in
the context of the Actavis decision, in particular its emphasis on the
instructive role played by payment. The Court in Actavis found that the
settlement at issue had the “potential for genuine adverse effects on
competition” since “payment in return for staying out of the market . . .
keeps prices at patentee-set levels.”114 In addition, the Court highlighted
the harms from a payment to a generic, which “in effect amounts to a
purchase by the patentee of the exclusive right to sell its product, a right
it already claims but would lose if the patent litigation were to continue
and the patent were held invalid or not infringed by the generic
product.”115
The Court revealed its strong preference for determining patent
strength by examining the payment rather than the patent. The “size of
the unexplained reverse payment can provide a workable surrogate for a
patent’s weakness, all without forcing a court to conduct a detailed
exploration of the validity of the patent itself.”116 Even strong patents
(i.e., those covering the active ingredient) are not immune from the
concern with payments, as an unexplained payment on a “particularly
valuable patent . . . likely seeks to prevent the risk of competition,” with
this consequence “constitut[ing] the relevant anticompetitive harm.”117
In other words, the Court made clear that risk aversion was not an
acceptable justification for a reverse-payment settlement.
In identifying the avoidance of the risk of competition as an
antitrust violation, the Court dispensed with the “risk aversion” defense
long advocated by settling parties (and economists), including in Actavis
itself. For example, in Actavis, a group of economists filed an amicus
brief that asserted that reverse payments “may . . . be necessary for brand
companies to overcome bargaining disadvantages caused by risk
aversion.”118 The brief also stated that “[b]rand companies are likely to
be more risk averse than their generic challengers because they usually
have significantly more to lose from a negative trial outcome.”119 And
it contended that “the size of a reverse payment generally does not
114. Actavis, 570 U.S. at 153-54.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 158.
117. Id. at 157.
118. Brief of Antitrust Economists as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 3, F.T.C.
v. Actavis, 570 U.S. 136 (2013) (No. 12-416).
119. Id. at 20.
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provide a reliable benchmark to determine whether the payment is
anticompetitive.”120 Faced squarely with these justifications, the Court
refused to accept them.121
But the power of the risk aversion argument is that the argument
keeps rolling down the mountain to the case law. This is remarkable
given that the Supreme Court pushed that boulder uphill, correctly
recognizing that reverse-payment settlements prevent the risk that a
patent will be invalidated or found to be not infringed.
In direct contravention of Actavis, the Third Circuit in In re
Wellbutrin XL Antitrust Litigation was “persuaded” by an economists’
amicus brief that “explains why risk aversion makes it difficult to use
the size of a settlement as a proxy for the brand-name’s likelihood of
success in litigation.”122 The court even found that this reasoning (which
the Supreme Court rejected in calling the “prevent[ion of] the risk of
competition” the “relevant anticompetitive harm”123) “serves as an
effective rebuttal to the [plaintiffs’] claim that the size of the reverse
payment is a ‘surrogate’ ” for patent weakness.124 The Third Circuit
seemed not to understand that a risk-aversion defense could be raised in
literally every case to justify a payment of any amount, no matter how
weak the patent, which would essentially immunize reverse-payment
settlements.
G. Settlements: Patent invalidity
A final challenge in the settlement context involves patent
invalidity in the determination of causation. The plaintiff in Actavis was
the Federal Trade Commission. As a government agency, the FTC does
not need to demonstrate causation because it automatically has
standing.125 In contrast, private plaintiffs need to make such a
showing.126 And some courts have required plaintiffs to “prove precisely
how, absent the illegal settlement agreement, generic entry would have

120. Id. at 21.
121. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, MARK D. JANIS, MARK A. LEMLEY, CHRISTOPHER R.
LESLIE & MICHAEL A. CARRIER, IP AND ANTITRUST: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST
PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW § 16.01[D], at 16-27 (3d ed. 2017)
(“[T]he Court did not accept as a justification risk aversion or the patentee’s desire to convert
an uncertain patent right into a certain one without litigation.”).
122. 868 F.3d 132, 168 (3d Cir. 2017).
123. Actavis, 570 U.S. at 157.
124. Wellbutrin, 868 F.3d at 168-69.
125. See, e.g., Cal. v. Am. Stores Co., 495 U.S. 271, 295-96 (1990).
126. See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae Federal Trade Comm’n in Support of No Party, In
re Nexium (Esomeprazole) Antitrust Litig. at 12-16, 842 F.3d 34 (1st Cir. 2016) (Nos. 152005, 15-2006, 15-2007).
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happened earlier.”127 Plaintiffs have pursued three paths to showing this:
patent litigation resulting in a finding of invalidity or noninfringement,
generic entry “at risk” (before a court has issued a finding that the patent
is invalid or not infringed) during the patent litigation, and a settlement
without payment allowing earlier entry.128 Courts applying a rigid
approach to causation require plaintiffs to select among these paths and
“prove specifically how entry would have occurred in the absence of the
illegal settlement agreement.”129
One example was provided by the only trial on a reverse-payment
settlement since Actavis, in which the jury issued a verdict for the
defendants. The jury found that AstraZeneca had exercised market
power, that the settlement included a “large and unjustified payment,”
and that it was “unreasonably anticompetitive.”130 But despite all of this,
the jury found that “[h]ad it not been for” the settlement, AstraZeneca
would not have “agreed with Ranbaxy that Ranbaxy might launch a
generic version of Nexium before May 27, 2014.”131 The court had
earlier raised concerns related to the plaintiffs’ ability to show causation,
given the failure to offer “direct evidence that the FDA was likely to
grant final approval to Ranbaxy’s generic Nexium product within the
proposed timeline,” as well as evidence that Ranbaxy would “never”
have launched generic Nexium at risk.132 In upholding the verdict, the
First Circuit found that “the district court saw no evidence that would
allow the plaintiffs to overcome the likelihood that [the brand firm’s]
patents, not its reverse payment . . . , were the bar to a generic launch.”133
The court concluded that the district court “did not err by requiring some
evidence of the patents’ invalidity or noninfringement before allowing
the plaintiffs to pursue an at-risk launch theory.”134
Similarly, in In re Wellbutrin XL Antitrust Litigation, the Third
Circuit rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the generic would have
launched at risk since this did not “take into account [a] blocking
patent.”135 The court stated that the plaintiffs were required to “show
that the launch would have been legal” because “if the launch were
127. Kevin B. Soter, Note, Causation in Reverse Payment Antitrust Claims, 70 STAN. L.
REV. 1295, 1314 (2018) (emphasis omitted).
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Jury Verdict in Favor of Defendants Against Plaintiffs Returned, In re Nexium
Antitrust Litig. (D. Mass. Dec. 8, 2014) (No. 12-md-02409), ECF No. 1374.
131. Id.
132. In re Nexium (Esomeprazole) Antitrust Litig., 42 F. Supp. 3d 231, 272 (D. Mass.
2014).
133. In re Nexium, 842 F.3d 34, 63 (1st Cir. 2016).
134. Id.
135. In re Wellbutrin XL Antitrust Litig. Indirect Purchaser Class, 868 F.3d 132, 165 (3d
Cir. 2017).
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stopped because it was illegal,” then the plaintiffs’ injury “would be
caused not by the settlement but by the patent laws prohibiting the
launch.”136
The Third Circuit also rejected plaintiffs’ “litigation-based
scenario” by which the generic would have prevailed in patent litigation.
Downplaying Actavis and drawing curious distinctions, the court
asserted that “[w]hile the size of the reverse payment may have some
relevance in determining how confident a litigant is in the strength of its
case,” it “is far from dispositive,” especially where “the settlement is
complex and multi-faceted” and “there are multiple plausible ways to
interpret the reverse payment.”137
In short, some courts have imposed causation as a Sisyphean hurdle
for plaintiffs, one that (in requiring plaintiffs to prove that the patent
definitively would have been ruled invalid) is nearly impossible to prove
and that flies in the face of the Court’s direction in Actavis that patent
validity need not be litigated.
H. Duties to deal
The final issue involves duties to deal. In the setting of denying
samples generics need to enter the market pursuant to REMS programs,
brand firms have claimed they have no duty to deal with rivals. For
example, Actelion contended that it “is under no duty to deal with or
assist its would-be generic competitors,” as the “well-settled rule of law
is subject to narrow and rare exceptions, none of which applies” to the
denial of samples.138 Speaking even more broadly, Actelion asserted that
“[t]his right to choose with whom to do business—and to choose not to
do business with a rival—is a cornerstone of America’s free enterprise
system, and is consistent with basic free market principles.”139
Continuing the theme of hyperbole, Celgene asserted that even if its
“insistence on appropriate procedures and guarantees were not
motivated by the safety of fetuses and the survival of its business,
antitrust law still would not require it to deal with its potential rivals.”140
To be sure, the Court in Trinko was skeptical of refusal-to-deal
cases, stating that “as a general matter, the Sherman Act ‘does not restrict
the long recognized right of [a] trader or manufacturer engaged in an

136. Id.
137. Id. at 168.
138. Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings
and to Dismiss Counterclaims at 2, Actelion Pharms. Ltd. v. Apotex, Inc. (D.N.J. Jan. 16,
2012) (Civ. 1:12-cv-05743), ECF No. 44-1.
139. Id. at 12.
140. Brief in Support of Defendant Celgene Corporation’s Motion to Dismiss, supra note
57, at 4.
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entirely private business, freely to exercise his own independent
discretion as to parties with whom he will deal.’ ” 141 On the other hand,
the “high value” that the Court “placed on the right to refuse to deal with
other firms does not mean that the right is unqualified.”142 The Court
explained that “[u]nder certain circumstances, a refusal to cooperate with
rivals can constitute anticompetitive conduct and violate [Section] 2.”143
While there might not be a general duty to deal in many contexts, several
factors presented by the combination of the unique pharmaceutical
regulatory setting and conduct that makes no sense other than by
harming a rival suggest an exception for REMS behavior.
First, the facts of REMS sample denials, with readily-available
samples, resemble those cases in which the Supreme Court has found
liability. The Court in Trinko found that the defendants in the cases of
Aspen Skiing v. Aspen Highlands Skiing144 and Otter Tail Power v.
United States,145 should have offered ski lift tickets and power
transmission, respectively, which were already available to the public.146
For REMS programs that the FDA requires after the drug is already on
the market, by definition the product is available. And even when a
sample is requested before approval, the brand is in the business of
producing drugs and the provision of a sample after the drug is
manufactured does not require additional effort.
Second, the REMS-related conduct makes no economic sense
absent the impairment of generic competition. Generics have been
willing to pay a high price for samples, with one even stating that it pays
“ridiculous amounts of money” for “a commercially immaterial quantity
of drug.”147 The caselaw provides examples of generics’ willingness to
purchase samples at a rate that would be profitable to the brand.148
The Court in Aspen Skiing found exclusionary conduct where a
defendant was “willing to sacrifice short-run benefits and consumer
goodwill in exchange for a perceived long-run impact on its smaller
rival.”149 In contrast, the Trinko Court denied liability where Verizon
141. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 408.
142. Id. (quotation omitted).
143. Id.
144. 472 U.S. 585 (1985).
145. 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
146. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 409-10.
147. The CREATES Act: Ending Regulatory Abuse, Protecting Consumers, and Ensuring
Drug Price Competition: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Competition, Policy &
Consumer Rights, S. Judiciary Comm., 114th Cong., at 2:10:38-47 (testimony of Beth Zelnick
Kaufman),
https://www.cspan.org/video/?411609-1/creates-act-ending-regulatory-abuseprotecting-consumers-ensuring-drug-price-competition.
148. Michael A. Carrier, Sharing, Samples, and Generics: An Antitrust Framework, 103
CORNELL L. REV. 1, 38-39 (2017).
149. Aspen, 472 U.S. at 611.
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could obtain only a “cost-based rate of compensation”150 from sharing
its network with rivals. Brands refusing to sell samples lose the
opportunity to obtain at least a market (and sometimes significantly
higher) price for samples.
Third is the ineffectiveness of the regulatory regime. The Trinko
Court underscored the importance of regulation (and lack of a need for
antitrust enforcement) in the setting of the Telecommunications Act,
which was effectively enforced through financial penalties, daily or
weekly reporting requirements, and the suspension or revocation of
long-distance approval.151 In contrast, antitrust regulation is needed in
this setting given that the REMS regime is not working as intended, with
the FDA unable to fix the problem and eager to punt competition issues
to the FTC.152
To date, this is one area where courts have appropriately
appreciated the role of antitrust liability. In distinguishing the sampledenial setting from Trinko, the court in Actelion v. Apotex explained that
the Supreme Court’s refusal-to-deal decisions were “fact-specific’ and
“industry-specific” and made clear that the FDA “d[id] not have the
regulatory power to compel samples” and that “there [was] no other
potential remedy to a defendant suffering anticompetitive conduct in that
regulatory scheme.”153 As a result, the court correctly found that
antitrust regulation was appropriate. In addition, the Mylan v. Celgene
court found that Third Circuit cases had found prior dealing between the
parties to be “relevant but not dispositive” in determining whether a duty
to deal applies.154
IV. CONCLUSION
Courts confronting pharmaceutical antitrust law issues face
significant challenges. The issues are complex. The courts yearn for
simplicity. And the defendants erect Sisyphean hurdles in the form of
facially reasonable arguments related to safety, innovation, and patents
that plaintiffs must rebut. As issues of drug pricing become more
150. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 409.
151. See Trinko, 540 U.S. at 412-14.
152. See, e.g., F.D.A., Statement from FDA Commissioner Scott Gottlieb, M.D., on new
agency efforts to shine light on situations where drug makers may be pursuing gaming tactics
to delay generic competition, May 17, 2018,
https://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm607930.htm
(“making public a list of companies that have potentially been blocking access to . . . samples
of their branded products”).
153. Transcript of Motions Hearing at 115-16, Actelion Pharm. Ltd. v. Apotex, Inc., Civ.
12-5743(NLH/AMD) (D.N.J Oct. 17, 2013), 2013 WL 5524078.
154. Transcript of Oral Opinion at 12-13, Mylan Pharms. Inc. v. Celgene Corp., Civ. 142094 (ES)(MAH) (D.N.J. 2015), 2015 WL 409655.
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prominent and the conduct described in this essay shows no signs of
abating, it is worth remembering the challenges confronting courts.

